A surprising connection on the professional network. A proposal of employment from a headhunter, probably a female agent, based in China. The opportunity to earn around £20,000 part-time preparing a handful of geopolitical analyses for a Chinese company containing “non-public” or privileged information. Payment in digital currency or cash preferred.
It may seem obvious, on this telling, that something about this method would be amiss. However, China’s powerful intelligence agency continues to view it worthwhile to use headhunters to attempt this – prompting MI5 to warn repeatedly about their operations online.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum stated operatives from China were contacting UK citizens on the platform on an extraordinary scale, at a frequency of ten thousand over the preceding 30-month period, seeking political, industrial, defense and scientific secrets. However a fresh initiative targeting politicians and parliament has prompted the intelligence service to act again.
A spying alert was issued on Tuesday via the offices of the Commons speaker and his Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and other operatives to contact Members of Parliament, peers, their staffers, economists, thinktanks – anyone who might provide information.
Security Strategy and Legislative Updates
In the typical style of British intelligence, there was no publication of the protective guidance from the agency or the Home Office. But the service knew its briefing note would become public once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the media helps the general population more easily recognize communications with a fraudulent purpose.
This warning has the effect of uncovering additional details from within Westminster, although that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The service aims for people in public life to recognize that simply because interactions on LinkedIn are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Additionally, the internal security service believed to have been reacting to a particular event in parliament, although the burst of activity does come after the awkward failure of the prosecution of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his associate Christopher Berry on a legal detail in recent months.
The two had been charged of working for the foreign power – a allegation they denied – but inability to successfully conclude a prosecution under the since replaced Official Secrets Act led to warnings that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Revised Laws and Beijing's Strategic Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing contains a note of its successor: “Those engaging in spying operations face substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” This constitutes a crime if somebody engages in behavior that could potentially “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural question, though, is what Beijing has to achieve. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an associate of theirs less so. But Beijing is also interested in the legislative body: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on matters such as Huawei or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being influenced by MPs.
Methodological Variations and Persistent Digital Threats
In part there are distinct approaches too. Autocratic regimes like China’s export information gathering methods and the size of its intelligence apparatus is vast, employing 300,000 individuals. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, commented it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have more English speakers involved in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is prepared to develop contacts over the long term and at times even the agencies have struggled to differentiate genuine connections and spying. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for what information is considered to be of value,” the minister responsible a government official informed parliamentarians on this week, but a rapid shift in the government situation may result in someone quickly marginal becomes significant.
Another way to consider the relentless efforts at secret intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the international competition between Beijing and the Western nations at a threshold under the point of outright war. The nation has increased its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of millions connected equipment.
Beijing is engaged in relentless attempts to find secret informants on UK politics via digital means because it seeks to be challenging, to demonstrate influence and because it has the capability.